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Introduction 
Increasingly consumers, employees and managers expect companies, particularly large 
multinationals, to go beyond their traditional role of creating, producing, packaging and selling—for a 
profit. Public opinion opines that job creation and tax paying no longer suffice as private sector’s sole 
contribution to society. The existence of tobacco and cigarette companies triggers the question of the 
reasonableness of CSR activities undertaken by the companies. While it is known that cigarettes have a 
negative impact on human health in particular, the act of tobacco companies that is by undertaking CSR has 
invited a huge controversy which is seen as a platform to maintain its operations. The common 
denominator among the vast majority of ethical or socially responsible investment policies and products is 
the exclusion of tobacco companies in their portfolios (Yack et al., 2001:191). 
Well-planned and well-managed philanthropy, from sponsoring music, film and art festivals to 
creating education programs for the disadvantaged to protecting the environment, in the name of corporate 
social responsibility (CSR) has become a necessary element in virtually every large corporation’s business 
plan. Many businesses from a wide range of sectors conduct projects and programmes that aim to reduce 
social inequity—by creating or improving health care or educational facilities, providing vocational and 
management training, enhancing the quality of leisure and cultural activities. Specific sectors are 
recognizing their responsibilities and orient their CSR efforts to areas especially relevant to their business. 
For example, food and beverage multinationals have specific responsibilities in terms of product marketing, 
consumers’ changing eating habits, and conditions under which agricultural commodities are produced and 
traded. Transport companies must contend with the environmental impact of their business as well as 
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traffic congestion, energy waste, safety and security and access to trade and enterprise opportunities. Major 
companies have developed programmes for small business development in Kenya, crime prevention in 
South Africa, business education in China, folk culture preservation in Venezuela, and medical treatment 
and flood relief in Pakistan. A few specific examples follow. 
British American Tobacco (BAT) had a virtual monopoly in parts of Africa, both in terms of tobacco 
manufacturing and sales of cigarettes. In eleven African countries BAT had more than a 90% share of the 
cigarette market (Awang, 2011: 289). The purpose of this paper is to examine the process is to demonstrate 
how British American Tobacco has used its corporate social responsibility strategy to cloud the controversy 
surrounding its activities in Cameroon. The paper further examines some of the controversies that surround 
the corporate social responsibility (CSR) activities of BAT in Cameroon through issues related to health, 
social and economic impacts of BAT’s activities in Cameroon from 1985 to 2010.  The paper therefore 
concludes that BAT’s heavy footprint on the African continent has wreaked havoc on the economy, health 
and welfare of the people, thus partially contributing to an increase in social spending by the government of 
Cameroon. 
 
Cameroon Tobacco Industry in Historical Perspective 
The tobacco industry and the consumption of cigarettes are controversial activities in virtually all 
the countries in the world. Yet the emergence of tobacco processing and cigarette producing companies, 
and an increase in tobacco consumption worldwide are alarming. In Cameroon, there were two major 
tobacco processing companies (BAT and SITABAC) and a number of subcontracting firms that dealt in 
tobacco products. British American Tobacco is one of the leading tobacco manufacturing and trading 
companies in the world. However, BAT is not the first tobacco company in Cameroon. Thus, we are going to 
present a historical background of cigarette manufacturing in Cameroon. Secondly, we will examine the 
factors that favoured the implantation of BAT in Cameroon. Finally we are going to describe the 
implantation proper of this economic entity in Cameroon. From a global perspective, the production, 
consumption and trade in tobacco from 1970 to 2000 is demonstrated in Table One below. 
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Table 1: Tobacco Production, Consumption and Trade (1970-2000) 
 
Source: USDA (2001), Tobacco: Situation and Outlook, ERS, TBS-249, April, Washington, DC 
 
 The cultivation of tobacco in Cameroon was started by the Germans, following the signing of the 
Germano-Duala Treaty in July 1884 (Eyongetah& Brain, 1974). At a very early date (1885), tobacco attracted 
some German firms in Cameroon. As early as 1887, experiments had proven that the colony could produce 
tobacco. The soils and climate favoured the cultivation of tobacco. In 1888, Jantzen and Thormahlen 
participated in the financing of Tabaksgeselleschaft, which turned out to be a lost venture in spite many 
valiant and costly efforts to make the production of tobacco a success (Rudins, 1936:272). A number of 
tobacco plantations were experimented in Mifi, Batchenga, Bibundi, Djombe and Jaunde (Yaoundé). The 
Djombe plantation was the first to produce tobacco that was demanded in 1894 at a higher price. However, 
this plantation gave up its activities in 1898 due to the lack of skilled workers and the need for labour 
contracts for periods long enough for the Germans to train workers on tobacco cultivation. The subsequent 
closure of the Djombe plantation led to the creation of another one in Bibundi (Rudins, 1936). 
 It was not until 1906/1907 that the Economic Committee of the Colonial Society in Germany became 
seriously interested in the production of tobacco in Jaunde, Mifi and Batchenga. This was as a result of the 
fact that the soil and climate in these areas was suitable for the cultivation of tobacco with seedlings 
supplied by the Botanical Garden in Victoria that was set up by the Germans. The Economic Committee 
studied the experiments carried out and issued positive reports on the findings. In 1910, a native farmer 
succeeded in raising tobacco in Yaoundé, which was exported to Germany for the production of cigar. After 
this date, interest in tobacco production was revived and a number of plantations turned to its cultivation. 
From 1911 to 1913, three tobacco plantations were successfully created in Yaoundé, Mifi, and Batchenga 
with a capital that stood at 400,000, 400,000 (approximately $229,000) and 2,600,000 Deutsche Marks 
(approximately $ 546,900) respectively. Trade statistics began to show a very rapid increase in the quantity 
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of tobacco exported from Cameroon after 1910. Tobacco was fast becoming an important article of trade for 
Cameroon when the First World War broke out. 
 Following the defeat of Germany in World War I, Cameroon became a mandate B territory of the 
League of Nations, controlled by France and Britain who occupied four-fifth and one-fifth of the territory 
respectively. As a result, the tobacco plantations that were started by the Germans fell in the hands of the 
French colonial administration. In 1945, the Serviced’ExploitationIndustrielle de Tabacs et des Allumettes 
(SEITA), a company owned by Regis Français des Tabacs replaced the Germans with similar methods of 
production in these areas (Njieunde, 1971: 131). Between 1950 and 1951, SEITA started extending its 
activities to the eastern part of Cameroon, where it carried out the cultivation of a specie of tobacco known 
as tabacs decape used in enveloping cigars. The rest of the farms were abandoned to La Societe Juan Bastos de 
l’Afrique Centrale for the cultivation of Maryland tobacco used in the production of cigarettes (Njieunde, 
1971: 134). 
 The involvement of La Societe Juan Bastos de l’Afrique Centrale in the cultivation of tobacco in 
Cameroon was already an indication to the headway in the transformation of tobacco leaves into cigarettes. 
On 2 July 1946, La Societe Juan Bastos de l’Afrique Centrale (hereafter referred to Juan Bastos) saw the day in 
Cameroon (Toussi, 1972:7). Between 1946 and 1982, this company enjoyed absolute monopoly in the 
manufacture and commercialisation of cigarettes in Cameroon in particular and the central African sub 
region in general.  During its existence in Cameroon from 1946 to 1986 Juan Bastos employed a number of 
Cameroonians.  More than 600 out of a population of close to 2,500,000 Cameroonians were employed to 
work both in the factory and in plantations of this company (Toussi, 1972:7).2 The company’s capacity to 
produce 1,200 tons of cigarettes a year permitted it to be competitive and face the challenges of any market 
situation in Africa as at that period. It should be understood that most of the raw tobacco used by the 
company for production of cigarettes was locally cultivated. Forty five percent of the tobacco came from the 
West province precisely from Mbouda. As years went by the quantity of tobacco imported reduced 
considerably from 2000 tons to 720 tons. Between 1963 and 1964, it reduced to 300 tons due to an increase 
in local production (DIC, 1965: 205). 
 The impact of the activities of Juan Bastos was felt especially in the economic domain since it 
employed about 600 Cameroonian and paid taxes to the state all of which help to foster the economic 
development of Cameroon. However, it should be known that though Juan Bastos was the only cigarette 
producing company in the country till 1982, it failed to meet up with the aspirations of consumers due to 
the poor quality of its products that contained a high volume of tar and nicotine that put the health of 
consumers at high risk (Awang, 2002). Thus, as a result of the poor quality of its products, poor marketing 
strategies and archaic managerial policies, the monopoly this company enjoyed form 1946 to 1982 started 
fading and finally died in 1983, following the establishment of a new tobacco company known as 
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LaSociètéIndustrielle des Tabacs du Cameroun (SITABAC) that was put in place in partnership with a German 
tobacco firmReetsma. As a result of the partnership this new comer had with its German partner, SITABAC 
was reinforced with improved techniques of production, elaborate market strategies, perfect communication 
network and more importantly the particular attention the Cameroon government accorded the enterprise, 
SITABAC came up to be the market leader in the Cameroon tobacco industry with a market share of more 
than 50% (Awang, 2002).  
 Paralysed by an in-adaptation to the changing environment, overtaken by panic and perforated by 
the featuring of the economic crisis that handicapped most African economies, Juan Bastos was obliged to 
give up its business. Against this background, and coupled with the fact that this company could no longer 
meet up with its financial obligations decided to sell out its assets.  In 1986, BAT Group acquired the assets 
of Juan Bastos and now became the legitimate owner (Awang, 2002).  
 BAT has historically held a virtual monopoly over cigarette sales in many African regions where 
Britain formerly controlled colonies; in 1912 BAT was among the world’s 12 richest companies. BAT 
continues to reap benefits from this colonial legacy today maintaining a stranglehold on Africa’s cigarette 
markets and is responsible for over 90% of cigarette sales in the following countries: Cameroon (85%); 
Ghana (99%); Kenya (92%) Malawi (91%) Mauritius (98%); Nigeria (92%); South Africa (94%); Sierra Leone 
(98%); Uganda (90%), Zambia (99%) and Zimbabwe(99%) (BAT, 2008). 
 BAT sells its cigarettes in over 38 African countries although it is difficult to get an exact picture as 
BAT itself refuses to release this information and smoking prevalence data is difficult to obtain. The large 
number of cigarette brands that BAT markets across the continent indicates the extent of its promotional 
agenda. This dominance appears to be paying off for BAT as profits in its “Africa and Middle East region” 
grew by £2 million (US$ 4 million) to £470 million in 2007 and sales in South Africa and Nigeria were 
particularly strong. For the six months ending June 2007, British American Tobacco Kenya announced pre-
tax profits and gross turnover growing by 26% to 7.08 billion Kenyan Shillings ( US$ 107,358,125), up from 
KES 5.6 billion (US$84,916,031) the previous year (BAT, 2008). 
 BAT Cameroon doubled export earnings in the financial year ending 2007 and achieved earnings 
worth $58 million. Share prices also rose as the company posted half year profits of 81 million francs CFA 
(BAT-CAMEROUN, 2007). In Nigeria in 2006, BAT’s market share and cigarette sales grew, especially its 
Benson & Hedges and Pall Mall brands, resulting in higher profit for BAT. In Cameroon, through its L&B 
brand, BAT has been able to dominate the cigarette market in the country since 1994 (BAT, 2008). 
 
The CSR Concept in the Tobacco Industry 
Of recent, multinational corporations have been confronted with rising expectations from their 
societal environment (Matten and Crane, 2005). Multinational corporations assumed responsibilities that 
once were regarded as a governmental domain: public health, education, social security, human rights 
protection, illiteracy, malnutrition, Aids, homelessness, just to mention a few examples of the expanding 
corporate non-business activities (Margolis and Walsh, 2003; Matten and Crane, 2005). With farsightedness, 
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Drucker (1973) described the changing role of business in society in the early 1970s. According to Drucker, 
“CSR demands that business takes responsibility for social problems, social issues, social and political goals 
beyond their core business activities” (Drucker, 1973:315). Corporate responsibility goes beyond the 
compliance with the legal and basic moral rules of society. As members of society, corporations have to take 
into account the common good and to improve societal welfare (Kok, et al., 2001). Corporations can 
demonstrate to their stakeholders that they are “doing the right thing” through their CSR engagement 
(Joyner and Payne, 2002:299). CSR normally aims at legitimizing a corporation's activities and increasing 
corporate acceptance and clientele. The preservation of societal acceptance is the main driving force of CSR 
activities (Weaver, Trevino and Cochran, 1999). Accordingly, corporate legitimacy has been described as the 
“yardstick” for the CSR discussion (Sethi, 1975; Carroll, 1979).  
This section will discuss selected aspects of CSR against the background of its legitimacy aspect 
since we expect it to be the main vulnerability of tobacco CSR. Due to the lethal character of smoking and 
the past behavior of tobacco companies, some key issues of CSR simply do not work the normal way. In the 
following, we will briefly discuss the limits of four issues that are normally regarded as important for 
achieving societal legitimacy through CSR engagement: corporate philanthropy, stakeholder collaboration, 
CSR reporting, and self-regulation activities. The discussion will demonstrate that these central aspects of 
the mainstream approach to CSR are ineffective or counterproductive in the tobacco industry.   
Corporate philanthropy is a core aspect of CSR. Doing good and giving back to society sometimes is 
even conflated with CSR or citizenship behavior itself (Matten and Crane, 2005; Porter and Kramer, 2002). 
For tobacco companies, a philanthropic approach to CSR runs into several constraints. A first constraint 
might be called the “dirty money” problem. The decision to contribute to charities is constrained by the 
public pressure on those who take money from tobacco companies. When BAT gave money to the University 
of Nottingham for the foundation of a CSR research center, they provoked a furious debate within and 
around the University (Maguire, 2000). Similarly, it caused a public outcry when it became known that BAT 
offered to sponsor students at the London School of Hygiene and Tropical Medicine (Meikle, 2002). In 
Hungary, BAT became the centre of attention of health advocates when it announced its substantial 
strengthening of the sponsorship of the University of Pécs that made it the principal sponsor of the second 
largest university of the country (Simpson, 2005). Western Michigan University was heavily criticized by 
Campaign for Tobacco-Free Kids for its decision to honor Philip Morris USA Inc. as its employer of the year 
(Prichard, 2004). Ethical Corporation magazine dropped Philip Morris as a possible sponsor for a corporate 
ethics conference in Hong Kong in October 2004 because two participants retreated in protest (Sydney 
Morning Herald, 2004). For tobacco companies, the number of potential beneficiaries of corporate 
philanthropy is considerably limited. 
A second constraint in the philanthropy context might be called the “strategy dilemma”. In the 
current debate it has been argued that corporations should choose a strategic approach to philanthropic 
engagement. A strategic approach is characterized by two aspects: The philanthropic engagement should be 
based upon core competencies and it should be used for improving corporate reputation (Porter and Kramer, 
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2002). Core competencies are for instance behind the CSR engagement of Deutsche Bank, Microsoft or 
Merck & Co. The Deutsche Bank engaged in the micro credit business building upon their banking 
competency. Microsoft focused its CSR engagement on IT education and lifelong learning. Merck & Co. 
built upon their research expertise and developed a drug against river blindness, distributing the drug free 
of charge and treating around 25 million people each year in developing countries. For tobacco companies a 
strategic approach to corporate giving is difficult to implement since the specific characteristics of its 
products do not allow for a focus on core competencies. The reputational aspect is quite problematic as well, 
since there might be even more pressure on the charity organization if the tobacco company decides to 
launch a cause-related marketing campaign around their engagement. Accordingly, a tobacco corporations' 
ability to improve their "competitive context" through acts of philanthropy (Porter and Kramer, 2002: 58) is 
considerably limited. A philanthropic doing-good strategy can neither build upon business core 
competencies nor be used for marketing without provoking strong reactions of indignation. Even if they 
engage in causes that are distant from their own business, tobacco companies might also provoke public 
resistance since the whole engagement might be suspected to be an act of window dressing, with the 
intention to blur intrinsic ethical problems of the industry and its products. 
Stakeholder collaboration has been identified as a main pillar of a credible CSR engagement. 
Corporate societal engagement should be based upon close collaboration within the stakeholder network 
(Calton and Payne, 2003). Collaboration not only leads to greater credibility of CSR activities, it furthermore 
promises positive effects on reputation. Collaboration with highly reputed organizations entails reputation 
spill-overs (Zimmerman and Zeitz, 2002). In the tobacco industry, the contrary has always been the case. 
Collaboration with external partners is limited by the reputational risks for those who cooperate with 
tobacco companies. This is especially true in the field of scientific research which is of paramount 
importance for tobacco companies. Scientific research that is sponsored by tobacco companies is exposed to 
conflicts of interest and unavoidably taste of manipulation (Kaufman et al., 2004).  
This can be seen in the fact that some scientific journals do not even publish research that is funded 
by the tobacco industry (Ong and Glantz, 2001). Being paid by the tobacco industry or cooperating with it 
threatens the reputation of the external partner, especially for cooperating scientific researchers or critical 
NGOs. There are two recent examples that demonstrate this. The collaboration between Philip Morris and 
Ragnar Rylander, an environmental medicine professor in Gothenburg whose research dealt with the health 
effects of passive smoking and who has been accused of scientific fraud (Tallmo, 2002). The donations of 
several tobacco companies to the environmental grassroots movement KAB (Keep America Beautiful) 
equally illustrate this phenomenon (Lamb, 2001). Collaboration is additionally limited because some of the 
most important stakeholders refuse to interact with representatives of the tobacco industry. It is precisely 
those potential partners with outstanding credibility such as the WHO that do not cooperate. On the 
contrary, they try to maintain arm's-length relationships with the industry (Ong and Glantz, 2001). For 
some actors in the tobacco stakeholder network, Freeman's (1997) "principle of limited immortality" is not 
acceptable. Being on a crusade against smoking, the continued existence of the corporations is not in the 
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interest of leading NGOs. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss the behavior of anti-tobacco 
activism even if their behavior might also provoke some critical questions. Some NGOs such as Ash or 
Tobacco free-kids refuse to talk to tobacco companies, some institutions, such as the WHO are at least very 
reluctant to talk to them in public. Anti-Tobacco NGOs often have no vision beyond the destruction of their 
counterparts. However, smoking is legal and a lot of people around the world smoke. Prohibition has not 
proved effective on the contrary, it has clearly brought to the surface and exposed the unintended 
consequences of criminalizing drugs. Even extremely critical NGOs cannot wish that controllable companies 
such as BAT or Philip Morris give their business to uncontrollable Mafia organizations that certainly would 
replace them. Irrespective of this, it seems that for tobacco companies, CSR must be pursued in coerced 
isolation from a large part of its relevant publics. 
In their CSR reporting, corporations normally focus on the positive effects of their activities, 
sometimes with smaller aspects of self-critique. If the social reporting of a tobacco company follows that 
mainstream approach to CSR reporting, it will not increase its credibility but rather be regarded as the 
perfect example of window-dressing. The first CSR report in the tobacco industry was published by BAT. It 
has been criticized for concealing the central aspect of its business, the annual death of millions of people 
(Burton and Rowell, 2002). As long as corporate transparency is limited in such a way, the industry must live 
with the general suspicion as formulated by Tapscott and Ticoll (2003: 283): “Nobody in the business of 
cigarette manufacturing can be a truly open enterprise, because the product causes harm”. Another 
particularity: While professional CSR reporting often helps companies to become attractive for socially 
responsible investment funds, in the case of tobacco companies this rarely happens. The common 
denominator among the vast majority of ethical or social responsible investment policies and products is 
the exclusion of tobacco companies in their portfolios (Yach et al, 2001: p. 191). The Zurich-based 
Sustainable Asset Management Fund (SAM) has come under attack for its decision to include BAT in the 
Dow Jones Sustainability Index (Burton and Rowell, 2002). It seems as if CSR reporting in the tobacco 
industry is much more delicate than in other industries. Tobacco companies cannot simply adopt the 
standards and procedures of mainstream reporting. They have to develop a different and more radical form 
of transparency. 
Self-regulation has become a major activity of transnationally operating companies that come under 
public pressure. Self-regulation is already criticized in other industries but it is even less acceptable for 
relevant stakeholders in the cigarette market (Hammond and Rowell, 2001). Voluntary initiatives that 
normally result in specific codes of conduct and monitored by the participating corporations themselves are 
often criticized to be mere acts of window-dressing. Without real transparency and third party control, it is 
often business as usual that takes place behind the veil of well-formulated ethical rules (Rondinelli, 2002). 
In their analysis of the Responsible Care Program in the chemical industry, King and Lenox describe how 
self-regulation without sanctions leads to opportunism (King and Lenox, 2000). Corporate self-regulation 
often lacks transparency, accountability, and thus is deprived of any legitimacy. It is not astonishing 
therefore that the World Health Organisation (WHO) questions the motivation of the tobacco industry 
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behind their decision to ban tobacco marketing aimed at children. “We have seen no evidence that tobacco 
companies are capable of self-regulation and we need to be alert to any new attempt to persuade us that this 
new effort will succeed” as the WHO general-director Gro Harlem Brundlandt argued (Rondinelli, 2002: 
407). When BAT, Philip Morris and Japan Tobacco adopted an international voluntary code of marketing, 
financial analysts did not expect any influence on sales volumes. "According to a leaked memo from a 
tobacco analyst for Credit Suisse Group the voluntary initiative was simply a way 'to improve the tobacco 
industry's image'" (Burton and Rowell, 2002). 
Deeply rooted distrust that has grown over decades seems to be the leitmotiv of the described 
deviations from standard reactions to corporate social engagement. Therefore, one of the key ambitions of 
the tobacco industry is to distance itself from its own former behavior demanding that the public should 
judge it by its current actions and not by its past activities. They portray themselves as a reformed industry 
and CSR engagement as well as CSR rhetoric is key elements of this strategy. 
However, a lot of relevant audiences still do not trust tobacco corporations because they do not 
believe in a genuine rupture with the past. The discovery of CSR in the tobacco industry is suspected to blur 
the "real" intentions of the corporations, their hidden agenda of business as usual. And indeed, some 
patterns of behavior of tobacco companies give reason to distrust the authenticity of their CSR engagement. 
In the paragraphs that follow our analyses will focus on the CSR controversies of BAT in Cameroon.  
 
CSR Entanglement by BAT 
 As the global spread of restrictions on tobacco advertising has accelerated, so the need for 
multinational tobacco corporations to develop alternative means of promoting cigarettes has become more 
pressing. Among the panoply of mechanisms employed by tobacco companies, their extensive reliance on 
sponsorship has acquired such significance for health that it has been plausibly described as the leading 
vector for the spread of tobacco-caused disease. This section aims to provide an appraisal of the CSR 
entanglements or controversies by BAT by analysing the economic, social, cultural and environmental 
impacts of tobacco manufacturing and consumption in Cameroon. 
 
Economic Impact 
 Though BAT was highly applauded in Cameroon and other African countries for creating jobs and 
paying taxes to the state, it goes without saying that this was equally very implicated in cigarette smuggling 
in the continent. Internal BAT documents reviewed to date suggest that BAT was involved in smuggling in 
about 30 countries in sub-Saharan Africa alone. From the late 1970s through at least the early 1990s, BAT 
organized both its legal and illegal African cigarette-sales operations into regional groupings based on 
geography and contraband flows. Cameroon, along with Equatorial Guinea and several inland smuggling 
destination countries, formed BAT’s “Unit II” sector.  These countries worked as a coordinated unit, 
particularly for contraband originally entering Africa from Europe and Latin America. Countries involved in 
Cigarette Company smuggling efforts usually served one of several purposes: either countries of origin, 
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destination countries or through transit countries for contraband cigarettes. Cameroon is particularly 
interesting because it served multiple roles for smuggled BAT brands. 
 A large percentage of the contraband flows of BAT brands originated from the company’s 
Southampton factory in England. In many regions of the world, cigarettes marked “Made in England” enjoy 
a certain cachet or extra appeal. Indeed, the BAT subsidiary BATUKE (BAT United Kingdom & Export), 
which is in charge of all UK-made BAT brand exports, is a major supplier of smuggled cigarettes worldwide. 
A BATUKE plan for 1993 to 1997, marked “SECRET,” states that just “two key General Trade markets will 
account for 4.7 billion units or 22% of BATUKE’s total shipments,” and £3.8 million (or approximately $6 
million in US dollars) “will be invested to grow our business in the GT markets” (BAT Internal Documents, 
1988). 
 From Southampton or other BAT factories, BAT’s cigarettes bound for illegal import into 
Cameroon—Benson & Hedges, Kent, Lucky Strike and others—frequently arrived in West Africa through 
Malabo, the capital of Equatorial Guinea. BAT’s contraband moved from Malabo through various ports of 
entry in Cameroon especially the Limbe and Kribi ports, and other African countries utilizing false north 
end of an island belonging to Equatorial Guinea. 
 
Health 
 Perhaps most remarkable, and most cynical, are those tobacco industry-sponsored programmes that 
aspire to public health goals. For instance, BAT Cameroun in August 2000, uniquely sponsored a health 
project in Fontem. This project that was carried out by the fifth and six year students of the Faculty of 
Medicines and Bio-medical Sciences (FMBS) of the University of Yaoundé I was to provide medical services 
to the inhabitants of the region. Within a period of ten days, these students diagnosed, cured diseases and 
advised the population of Fotabong, Foto, Fonjumeta and Menji on health issues through a free consultation 
exercise that was organised in these localities. During this exercise, they investigated the nutritional state 
of children between the age of zero to five years, pregnant women and the vaccines level of children. More 
than 3,000 patients that made up 25 percent of the targeted population were consulted. It should be 
understood that, this was the second phase of the project, given that the first phase that consisted of 
identifying the health priorities of Fontem and its environs was executed in 1999.  
 Thus, the purpose of the second phase was to provide concrete solutions to the problems that were 
diagnosed during the first phase. For this project to be realised, BAT Cameroon spent 5,000,000 CFA francs 
(BATCAMEROUN, 2000: 7). Beside the amount of money spent, BAT Cameroon equally provided antibiotics, 
antiparasites and anti-malaria drugs that were put at the disposal of local population. In the domain of 
welfare activities, BAT Cameroon on July 2000 made a donation of three computers to the Bankim 
Handicapped Centre. The significance of these gifts was to reduce the sufferings of a people faced with the 
adversities of life. This permitted the handicapped centre to discover its talents and maximum potentials 
and equally went a long way to ameliorate the situation of the Centre as well as that of the society 
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(BATCAMEROUN, 2000). Thanks to these donations the suffering masses of this centre had the opportunity 
gain basic knowledge in information and communication technology. 
 However, no mention was made of the link between smoking and cataracts, a major cause of 
blindness that has affected many in developing countries. There is growing evidence of an association 
between smoking and the spread of tuberculosis. A 2005 South African study found areas of Cape Town 
experiencing high rates of TB where 82% of TB sufferers were smokers or ex-smokers (BBC News, 2008).  Dr.  
Peter Ormerod of the British Thoracic Society commented: “This study supports other evidence showing an 
association between smoking and TB risk. …People who smoked would therefore be more at risk of 
acquiring TB” (BBC News, 2008). South Africa is burdened by one of the worst TB epidemics in the world 
with an estimated 180 507 cases in 1997, amounting to 419 per 100 000 of the total population. 
 
Education 
 Another field where several tobacco companies focused their CSR activities is education, often in 
the form of grants, scholarships, professorships, even the construction of classrooms for schools. BAT 
Cameroon accorded university grants to 60 students of the six state universities of Cameroon in 1998. The 
aim was to permit students with excellent academic records but limited financial means to pursue studies in 
fields such as agricultural engineering, journalism, management, medicines, information technology and 
social sciences. This was realised through scholarships—especially to science and management students.  It 
is in this light that BAT Cameroon for example took the responsibility of sponsoring laureates in the 
Catholic University of central Africa from 1996. It equally awarded prizes to the students of the Science 
Department of the University of Yaoundé I who excelled in their domain of studies. This event was 
organised annually in the Campus of the University of Yaoundé I (Awang, 2011: 292). BAT Cameroon 
equally recruited students for internship. The aim of such an undertaking was to acquaint students with a 
professional milieu. The number of students retained annually ranged from 90 to 150 (Awang, 2011). 
 Still in the domain of higher education, BAT Cameroon was the principal sponsor of the university 
games that started in 1998. Its active support towards this event took off from a global engagement put in 
place by the BAT Group to benefit the communities in which it operates Acknowledging that the future of 
the state is decided in universities, the BAT Group felt that support to university institutions in such a 
manner contributed to the edification of the state. Its involvement in this project was noticed through the 
trophies it donated, the medals and jerseys used for the games were entirely supplied by BAT Cameroon. 
And most importantly some of the playgrounds that were used for the Games were constructed by this 
company. For example, during the 2000 edition of the games in Buea, BAT Cameroon constructed a 
volleyball playground with a value of   13,000,000 FCFA ($25,000) (BATCAMEROUN, 2000:15). After the 
2002 Edition that took place in the University of Douala, BAT Cameroon stopped sponsoring this event 
because of the controversy that surrounded the activity of this company.  
 It should be said that though BAT succeeded to sponsor these events in Cameroon, a less successful 
attempt to buy academic credibility was BAT’s efforts to offer a London School of Hygiene and Tropical 
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Medicine student a £1500 grant as well as the opportunity to work in the company’s research and 
development unit at its Southampton factory on completion of the degree. Professor David Leon, upon 
learning of the offer told the company “to take its money elsewhere.” He replied to the company: “You must 
think that academics and students in epidemiology are both extremely stupid and mercenary. There is no 
need to recite to you the responsibility BAT has for millions of deaths as it continues to push tobacco 
around the world” (World Health Organisation, 2008). 
 
Youth Smoking prevention 
 One area where nearly every major tobacco company invests publicity efforts to improve their 
corporate image is the development and promotion of ineffective youth smoking prevention programmes. 
While these programmes are created to appear to dissuade or prevent young people from smoking, in fact 
the effect is often the contrary. By portraying smoking as an adult activity, these programmes increase the 
appeal of cigarettes for adolescents. Proposed measures that involve proof of age for purchase at the 
counter are ultimately ineffective, as young people easily circumvent these restrictions. Tactically, these 
programmes serve the purpose of creating the appearance that tobacco companies are proposing solutions 
for the problems they create. In reality, they detract attention from proven, effective solutions—including 
price and tax increases—to which young people are particularly sensitive. 
Tobaccocompaniesvigorouslyopposepriceandtaxincreases (WHO, 2008). 
 A number of BAT’s CSR campaigns in Africa focused on what BAT refers to as “Youth Smoking 
Prevention”. However, there is no evidence that such schemes decrease smoking among young people but 
there is evidence that they can be counter-productive. Such schemes encourage children to see smoking as 
an adult activity and therefore something to aspire to. They also give the impression that cigarette addiction 
is a youth issue and that once a young person reaches 18 it is acceptable to smoke. Despite BAT’s purported 
stance on youth smoking prevention it is clear that because so many long term smokers die in middle age, 
the tobacco industry is in perpetual need of new young customers. 
 
Culture 
 In the domain of culture, the company sponsored some cultural manifestation. In its corporate 
programme concerning cultural activities, BAT Cameroon manifested its support through the sponsoring of 
it accorded to cultural groups. In 1998, BAT Cameroon donated the sum of 1,000,000 FCFA ($2,000) to the 
National Museum in Yaoundé. This was to enable the museum acquire some cultural object that could 
helped to boost the cultural heritage of Cameroon. During that same year, BAT Cameroon offered the sum 
of 2,000,000 FCFA ($4,000) as support for the Kilum Mountain Project. Still in 1998, the enterprise assisted 
the private sector in financing the bi-annual conference of six hundred traditional chiefs that held in the 
South West Province for three days. BAT Cameroon is equally the principal sponsor of the NGUON festival 
that is manifested annually by the Bamouns. During the 2000 edition of this festival, BAT Cameroon offered 
the sum of 13,000,000 FCFA ($25,000) to the Sultan of the Bamouns for the event (Awang, 2002). 
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 From the artistic point of view, BAT Cameroon had manifested its intervention by sponsoring artists 
such as Petit Pays, Jean Pierre Essome, Ben Decca, Papillion and a host of others. In 1998/1999, BAT 
Cameroon integrally sponsored the musical concerts of General Defao, a famous artist from the Democratic 
Republic of Congo who organised concerts in the major cities of Douala and Yaoundé. Added to this, the 
company constantly sponsored “REMY” (les Rencontres Musicales de Yaoundé) (Awang, 2002).  
 However, notwithstanding this charitable gesture that the company made, the company is still seen 
as one that is involved in a controversial activity that has a serious effect on the health of those that 
consume its products. In addition to this, BAT had equally been involved in illicit activities that made its 
reputation questionable. 
 
Sports 
 The presence of BAT Cameroon was equally noticed in the domain of sports. Since 1990, this 
enterprise organised the golf competition named “Caddies-Members Golf Tournament”. Apart from the 
trophies it offers, BAT Cameroon, in May 2000 awarded scholarships to young Cameroonians who 
distinguished themselves during the edition of the year BATCAMEROUN, 2000). 
 Still in the domain of sports, following the victory of the Olympic Squad of the Indomitable Lions 
(LionsEspoirs) in the Sydney Olympic Games 2000, BAT Cameroon, offered a cheque of 24,000,000 FCFA 
($50,000)to be shared equitably amongst the players and coaches. The General Manager of the company 
handed this cheque to the team captain, Patrick Mboma. In sum, these are just some of the spotlights of the 
engagements of   BAT Cameroon towards the environment in which it operates BATCAMEROUN, 2001). The 
pictures on the page below demonstrate some of the community activities carried out by BAT Cameroon. 
 
Environmental Strategy 
 Internal documents at BAT reveal how a strand of BAT’s CSR involved a calculated strategy to 
collaborate with NGOs in order to gain public support for its environmental policies CORA, 2000). Over the 
last seven years, following through on its long term strategy to engage with “reasonable NGOs” BAT has 
fostered relationships with the Earthwatch Institute, Fauna &Fauna International, Royal Botanic Gardens 
Kew and The Tropical Biological Association to particular effect (CORA, 2000). In 2008 BAT’s Biodiversity 
Partnership boasts of supporting 43 projects, many in Africa. 
 A number of the projects are ecologically themed “volunteering and training” opportunities for BAT 
employees. BAT uses such projects as a way of promoting its biodiversity credentials while boosting staff 
morale and skills. Other BAT biodiversity projects in Africa include Mountain Gorilla conservation 
programmes in Rwanda, Great Ape Habitat Conservation Programmes in Nigeria and Cameroon and a 
project to enhance the conservation of Lake Victoria in Kenya (BAT, 2006). 
 The WHO has observed that when BAT and others in the industry devote portions of profits to CSR 
projects, the companies are often disguising other aims: 
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[…] socially responsible initiatives, so-called by transnational tobacco companies, sit side by side with 
their continued involvement in aggressive advertising and sponsorship campaigns directed at young 
people, financial pressures they impose on countries that attempt to limit tobacco marketing, their 
deliberate deception in many developing countries concerning the dangers of second-hand smoke, and 
attempts to actively undermine the tobacco control activities of the World Health Organization” (WHO, 
2004). 
 
Advertisement Impact 
 Despite the massive socio-economic and health burden smoking is placing on African societies, BAT 
continues to market cigarettes here, as elsewhere, by associating its brands with glamour, style, vitality, 
beauty, sport, sexual allure, celebrity, contemporary fashion and modern living - methods it claims to have 
voluntarily given up using in the UK thirty years ago (ASH, 2007). Furthermore, BAT breached its marketing 
code by allowing its cigarettes to be sold singly rather than in packs of 10 or 20. In Cameroon, 
advertisements were even produced detailing the price of 1, 2 or 3 “sticks” (ASH, 2007). Because BAT cannot 
be trusted to keep within even its own marketing codes of conduct in countries where advertising bans are 
partial or not fully implemented, only a comprehensive ban can protect people from its marketing tactics 
and reduce tobacco consumption. In 2000, a global review of the effect of tobacco advertising bans on 
consumption concluded that “. . . a comprehensive set of tobacco advertising bans can reduce tobacco 
consumption but a limited set of advertising bans will have little or no effect.” BAT held a series of 
promotion shows across Africa in 2007 and 2008. During such promotion shows, customer stood a chance of 
winning various prizes that ranged from television sets, motorbikes to cash prizes.  
 In its foreword, British American Tobacco’s Social Report 2001/2002 was cited as “a serious 
commitment to embedding the principles of Corporate Social Responsibility in the British American 
Tobacco Group.” The report goes on to explain that a “formal CSR governance structure” has been 
established and that the company has “much to offer in helping to address the problems that concern our 
stakeholders, including supporting soundly-based tobacco regulation and reducing the impact of tobacco 
consumption on public health.” This report and these tobacco industry programs that seek to contribute to 
a greater social good urge the question: how can tobacco companies reconcile their main aim, to gain a 
maximum profit by producing and selling a deadly product, with the goals of CSR: business norms, based on 
ethical values and respect for employees, consumers, communities and the environment? How can they 
claim to promote transparent business practices, calling for open dialogue among stakeholders when public 
inquiries and legal testimonies in courts in countries around the world attest to tobacco companies’ actions 
and strategies to conceal the deadly nature of their products, derail work to protect public health and 
destroy incriminating evidence? 
 In many respects, tobacco companies are simply not like other companies. Tobacco products are 
legal. But they are also lethal. Tobacco is the only consumer product available that kills one-half of its 
regular users. As such, in terms of CSR activities, they cannot simply figure among the ranks of other 
consumer goods companies. Despite the tobacco industry’s thinly-veiled attempts to gain corporate 
respectability and companies’ claims to have changed their practices, they continue to use a vast of array 
unethical and irresponsible strategies to promote its products, expand markets and increase profits. 
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 All these investigations consistently point to the discrepancy between the measures that tobacco 
companies internally recognize to be the greatest threats to their sales, and those that they champion in 
public. For example, companies publicly deny the connection between smoking prevalence and tobacco 
advertising, but internally acknowledge that advertising bans are a threat to tobacco sales, and a key priority 
for thwarting regulatory action. Companies constantly insist that they do not market to young people while 
internal documents clearly demonstrate otherwise. 
 Through voluntary Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) programmes BAT purportedly addresses 
its social and environmental impacts. BAT has established a Corporate and Regulatory Affairs Department 
(CORA) to oversee a CSR agenda that promotes BAT as engaged in contributing to “Civic Life and 
Empowerment” by encouraging branches around the world “to enrich public and community life.”  It is well 
documented that the gap between BAT’s CSR goals and their actual impact is stark. BAT’s reported 
achievements sit uneasily alongside aggressive cigarette marketing and do little to address the key health, 
socio-economic, human rights and environmental impacts of cigarettes. Internal BAT documents have been 
made available to the public due to a legal settlement that required tobacco companies to provide public 
access to its document archives. In the archives ASH found documents that illustrate the real thinking 
behind BAT’s CSR strategy. For BAT it was essential the CORA strategy be mobilised on a consistent basis 
worldwide. To this end the roadmap was presented to regional managers in Africa in 2000 to be adopted, 
planned and driven forward into the 21st century. 
 
Conclusion 
Cameroon has been a regional hub for tobacco cultivation and manufacture. This has ensured a 
strong presence of the Tobacco Industry throughout the tobacco growing, manufacture, trade and 
consumption chain. The tobacco market is growing at a worrying trend with both locally manufactured 
products and imports, and tobacco products are becoming more and more accessible over the years 
especially to the youth. 
The economic might enjoyed by the Industry has facilitated their influence in political and policy 
processes. Lack of clear guidelines for interaction between the industry and the government has exacerbated 
the situation. Cameroon signed and ratified the FCTC and is therefore bound by the guidelines to Article 5.3 
of the FCTC which call for caution in Government Industry interactions in order to protect public health 
policies from commercial and other vested interests of the tobacco industry. 
There lacks a common understanding of tobacco control by the relevant ministries and agencies/ 
departments of government; with some still viewing tobacco trade and by extension the tobacco industry as 
a useful contributor to the national economy. This lack of awareness extends to key policy makers, 
politicians as well as the general public. The industry has used this lack of awareness to lobby against 
tobacco control measures and in many instances violate the existing law.  
Against the backdrop that the commercialisation of tobacco in any form is a thread to the 
emergence envisaged by Cameroon in 2035, this paper has come up with the following recommendations: 
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 The Government should develop regulations on interaction with the industry if and when such 
interaction is necessary and prohibit any interaction that may lead to undue influence and 
interference. These regulations should be in line with the WHO FCTC guidelines on 
implementation of Article 5.3 of the FCTC and should guide all government officers and other 
relevant stakeholders on how to interact with the industry in a manner that protects public 
health policies in relation to tobacco control from commercial and other vested interests of the 
industry. Health interests of Cameroonians must always take precedence over the Tobacco 
Industry. 
 In addition to the above, there should be greater transparency in Government interaction with 
the Industry. For example where possible meetings with the Industry should be held in public or 
at the very least minutes and or reports of such meeting should be publicly accessible. 
 The Government should support Tobacco farmers to move to alternative livelihoods to reduce 
their over-reliance on the tobacco industry. This includes the development and implementation 
of a policy on Alternative Livelihoods (AL) and subsequent support that the farmers may need in 
order to facilitate a smoother transition. 
 Awareness programs should be run for non- health Ministries such as Finance, Trade and 
Agriculture in order to build their capacity on tobacco control and the Industry. Awareness 
creation is also necessary for specific policy makers, politicians as well as the general public. 
 All stakeholders should be alert to Industry activity in order to identify instances of tobacco 
industry interference. The Civil Society in particular should monitor and expose interference 
activities. 
 Collaboration between Civil Society and Government should be strengthened in order to 
improve surveillance, reporting and enforcement mechanisms 
 Enforcement of existing law should be enhanced in order to promote compliance. For example 
majority of imported tobacco products do not comply with the labeling provisions of the 
Tobacco Control Act. 
 
If these measures are taken and implemented by the Cameroon, the involvement of youths in 
smoking and cigarette addiction will be on a decline and as such, the production and consumption capacity 
of the country will improve. In the hope that these measures may be implemented by other African 
countries, the dream of Africa emerging by 2030 as production hub for the global economy shall be 
achieved. 
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RESUMO 
A implementação da responsabilidade social corporativa (CSR) por empresas com má reputação, 
especialmente as envolvidas na produção de tabaco, atraiu críticas de vários setores. Desde meados da 
década de 1980, as empresas de tabaco intensificaram as estratégias de expansão do mercado em vários 
países africanos. Elas usaram música para atrair jovens e crianças, organizaram desfiles de moda para atrair 
as mulheres para fumar, ofereceram cigarros livres para crianças nas ruas e, por muito tempo, minaram os 
esforços dos governos para implementar uma legislação eficaz sobre o tabaco e participaram ativamente do 
contrabando de produtos de tabaco no continente. Pior ainda, as empresas de tabaco persuadiram alguns 
governos africanos a promover o cultivo do tabaco como uma importante fonte de ganhos no exterior e, nos 
últimos anos, a indústria do tabaco recorreu ao uso da responsabilidade social corporativa (CSR) para 
massagear sua imagem e para cobrir sua trilha. A British American Tobacco (BAT), que é o foco deste artigo, 
teve um monopólio virtual em partes da África, tanto em termos de fabricação de tabaco quanto de vendas 
de cigarros. Em onze países africanos, a BAT tinha mais de 90% do mercado de cigarros. Este artigo examina 
alguns dos impactos de saúde, sociais e econômicos das atividades das BATs em África de 1985 a 2010 
usando Camarões como estudo de caso. O objetivo deste artigo é demonstrar como a British American 
Tobacco usou sua estratégia de responsabilidade social corporativa para encobrir a controvérsia que envolve 
suas atividades nos Camarões. 
O documento conclui, portanto, que a forte pegada do BAT no continente africano causou estragos na 
economia, na saúde e no bem-estar das pessoas, contribuindo parcialmente para o aumento dos gastos 
sociais do governo dos Camarões. 
 
Palavras-chave:Responsabilidade Social Corporativa, British American Tobacco, Saúde, Desenvolvimento 
comunitário, Sustentabilidade, Metas de desenvolvimento do milénio. 
 
ABSTRACT 
The implementation of corporate social responsibility (CSR) by companies that have a bad reputation, 
especially those involved in tobacco production has attracted criticisms from various quarters. Since the 
mid-1980s, tobacco companies have intensified market expansion strategies in several African countries. 
They have used music to target youths and children, organised fashion shows to entice women into 
smoking, offered kids free cigarettes on the streets and for a very long time undermined efforts by 
governments to put in place effective tobacco legislation and actively participated in the smuggling of 
tobacco products into the continent. Worse still, tobacco companies persuaded some African governments 
to promote tobacco cultivation as a major source of foreign earnings, and in recent years, the tobacco 
industry has resorted to using Corporate Social Responsibility (CSR) to massage its image and cover its 
tracks. British American Tobacco (BAT), which is the focus of this paper, had a virtual monopoly in parts of 
Africa, both in terms of tobacco manufacturing and sales of cigarettes. In eleven African countries BAT had 
more than a 90% share of the cigarette market. This paper examines some of the health, social and 
economic impacts of BAT’s activities in Africa from 1985 to 2010 using Cameroon as a case study. The 
purpose of this paper is to examine the process is to demonstrate how British American Tobacco has used its 
corporate social responsibility strategy to cloud the controversy surrounding its activities in Cameroon. 
The paper therefore concludes that BAT’s heavy footprint on the African continent has wreaked havoc on 
the economy, health and welfare of the people, thus partially contributing to an increase in social spending 
by the government of Cameroon. 
 
Key-words: Corporate Social Responsibility, British American Tobacco, health, community development, 
sustainability, millennium Development Goals. 
